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Synopsis
Optical orthogonal codes (OOC) have been investigated as an important technology to achieve
optical CDMA systems. Recently, some security analyses were published, where they have a problem
of weakness against eavesdropping. In this paper, we propose a new security measure for an optical
CDl\1A system from the viewpoint of eavesdroppers. We derive distributions of code detection time by
using a technique based on statistical approach, and evaluate robustness of the optical CDMA system
using for several well-known OOCs.
1 Introduction
Optical orthogonal codes (OOe) realize asynchronous optical CDMA systems via all optical circuit
by intensity modulation and incoherent direct detection, and there are many studies for a long time[l].
However, there is a security problem that eavesdropping is easy for the asynchronous optical CDMA
systems, so we have make to security enhancement on OOCs[2].
A security measure of optical CDMA systems is evaluated by Shake[3] [4] based on a probability
of code detection. Even in condition that the probability of code detection is low, we might say that
security measure is low if time until the codewords are detected entirely is short. In other words, to
evaluate security strength, we must show difficulty of the code detection for eavesdroppers. Therefore,
in this paper, we pay our attention to required time to detect codewords as a difficulty. \Ve can say that
security strength is high, if ,ve observe that the eavesdroppers need long time for code detection. We
show one of eavesdropping methods based on a statistical approach. The distribution of the codeword
detection time using this method, and a trade-off between the accuracy of detection and detection
time.
2 Optical CDMA Systen1. and Weakness
Figure 1 shows a transmission part of an optical CDMA system in which users' signals are spreading
in time domain using an optical orthogonal code. There are k users with different codewords. Users'
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Fig. 1 : The model of optical CDMA system and
tapping position for eavesdropping.
Fig. 2 : An example of overlapped optical signal
and easily detectable codeword.
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signals are encoded by their codewords after on-off-keying(OOK) data modulation. In Fig. I, an
eavesdropper taps a mixed signal from optical fiber. He detects a signal that overlapped all users'
codewords and has to make codeword separation.
However, actually the codewords of all users may not always sent at the same time when OOK is
used. Figure 2 shows an example that only one user sends a codeword and the other users do not. In
this case, only one codeword appear in the fiber as non-mixed signal, the eavesdropper can detect the
codeword by just tapping the optical fiber. This is the weakness of the optical CDMA systems using
optical orthogonal codes.
3 An Eavesdropping Method Based on Statistical Approach
As the eavesdropping method based on statistical approach, the eavesdropper acquires a series of
lots of samples from optical fiber, and estimates codewords using its distribution. Code length, code
weight and the gap between pulses in codewords is required to estimate codewords. But it needs to
take long time to estimate all parameters perfectly due to huge code search space. Therefore, in this
paper, we estimate code weight first, and then estimate codewords using estimated code weight.
3.1 Code Weight Estimation
As shown in Fig. 3 (a), it begins with estimation of the code weight that the eavesdropper samples
the mixed optical signal that did in tapping in length L. In addition, we assume that the code weight
of all users is the same, and the eavesdropper can sample in correct chip rate. The eavesdropper
counts optical pulses of each sample and makes a histogram of optical pulses as shows in Fig. 3 (b).
The eavesdropper N times samples mixed signals.
Next, the eavesdropper estimates the code weight by refferring the histogram of optical pulses;
"\iVhen L is larger than the code length and N is large enough, the histogram becomes non-uniform.
It is seen peaks at measurement times of code weight w. Although high floors that is not the peak by
mismatch of the sequence length and codeword, the eavesdropper can improve estimation accuracy
of code weight by setting appropriate detection condition. The proposed detection methods and the
detection conditions are as follows. First, the eavesdropper demands frequency while adding to length
L of the sample sequence till a peak is seen in distribution. If the first peak of pulse count, WI, is half
of the second peak, W2, assuming code weight is WI, and set w to be WI. Figure 4 shows a flowchart
of code weight estimation process. If the code length is already turn out, the length L might be the
code length. Also in this case, the distribution of pulses shows some peaks, the first peak WI might a
code weight.
3.2 Codeword Estimation
Since the code length and the code weight are already detected by the previous process, the
eavesdropper sets code length L and he repeats to sample of optical sequence. The number of pulses
in each sample sequence is checked one by one whether it is equal to w. If the condition doesn't
satisfied, the sequence is discarded. Otherwise, the sequence is shifted so that the shortest gap may
becon'les the first in order to be easy to compare with others. The distribution shown in Fig. 5 is
provided if sequences is sorted by the number of detections. In this paper, we pay attention to the
major detected sequences as estimated codewords of the code. A threshold is introduced for decision of
major sequences. After arranging the frequencies of the sequences in descending order, Each frequency
is checked whether it is less than ~ times the previous frequency. If so, we assume the sequences after
that is not major. In this manner, we find out major sequences that the frequencies are relatively high
compared to others. Here r is defined as the code detection threshold.
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Fig. 3 : Code weight estimation method based on
statistical approach.
r is called a code detection threshold. Figure 6 shows a flowchart of the process of estimating
codeword.
4 Simulation Results and Discussions
In this paper, we simulated by the same constitution as Fig. 1. Each user uses the same bit rate,
the same code length, the same code weight and difl'erent codeword. We have made some additional
assumptions that each user also has specific delay less than code length, synchronization in term
of chip time, and non-synchronization in term of codeword. The eavesdropper uses receiver that is
synchronized in term of chip time, can completely distinguish chips of codewords, and already detected
code length.
4.1 Estimation Result of Code Weight
Figure 7 shows estimation results of code 'weight in the case of OOC(31,3,l,1) with code length of
31, code weight of 3, and optimal correction design. The presumption accuracy improves when the
number of samples, N, increases, and also the sequence length which is necessary for the code weight
estimation increases too.
Figure 8 shows estimation results of code weight in the case of various codes. L becomes large
by the short code length or less active users. Because there are few optical pulses in each sample
sequence, it takes long time to make the histogram.
4.2 Estimation Result of Codeword
Figures 9 and 10 show distributions that the number of samples until codeword estimation com-
pletely ends under code length and code weight are already detected. OOC(31,3,1,1) is used in Fig. 9
and OOC(61,4,1,l) is used in Fig. 10.
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Fig. 9: The trade-off between the accuracy of
detection and detection time (OOC(31,3,1,l)).
Fig. 10: The trade-off between the accuracy of
detection and detection time (OOC(61,4,1,1)).
If the probability of undetected codeword, PE,undetect> is compared with code detection threshold
r, as much as r increases, PE,undetect decreases, and the required time until codeword detection, code
detection time increases. Because the number of optical pulses in sample sequence is insufficient to
build the histogram, PE,undetect decreases and the code detection time increases when the long code
length is used. If the active users are increased, then code detection time increases. However, as shown
in Fig. 10, when the number of active users is few and the number of optical pulses in the sample
sequences is very few, most sample sequences are discarded and code detection time increases, and a
time of codeword detection increases as well as increasing the code length.
5 CancIusian
In this paper, we consider the code detection time as the security measure of optical CDMA
systems, and we proposed the eavesdropping method based on statistical approach. The simulation
results of eavesdropping showed, we found that the code detection time increases if the code length
or the number of active users increase. As the result of discussion in this paper, we conclude that we
can use the code detection time for the security measure.
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